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This article traces the parallel  evolution of American-Turkish relations and Turkish 
democratisation from 1945 to 1952. It shows how American officials disregarded the Turkish 
experiment with democracy when formulating policy even as they publicized the merits of 
Turkish democratisation to the American people and the US Congress. US decision-makers 
knew  that  they  needed  Turkey  as  a  bulwark  against  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  eastern 
Mediterranean and the Middle East. To that end, officials in Washington pondered over ways 
to integrate Turkey to the emerging Western camp at the right moment and in the most cost-
effective way.
From 1945  until  1952,  American-Turkish  relations  were  driven  by  realpolitik.  US 
policy involved significant measures to promote closer ties between the United States and 
Turkey on the one hand and to garner domestic support for US objectives in Turkey on the 
other. The Truman administration used democracy as a rhetorical device in order to realise 
its  goals  in  Turkey.  The  administration  openly  lauded  the  ‘development  of  Western 
democracy in Turkey’1 but Turkey’s real importance for the United States lay in its location. 
The  Americans,  therefore,  cared  much  more  about  internal  stability  in  Turkey  than  the 
democratic nature of its regime. In fact,  behind closed doors, they often saw the two as 
contradictory.2
1 Counsellor of the Embassy Herbert S. Bursley to the Secretary of State, dispatch. no. 1819, Ankara, 30 
August 1947; Internal Affairs of Turkey, 1945-1949 (hereafter IAT) [microfilm]; reel 4.
2 According to historian David Schmitz, at the meeting of US chiefs of mission in Rio de Janeiro in March 
1950,  George Kennan discussed how ‘Turkey and Portugal  are  examples of  nations which have been 
successful in repressing Communism’. ‘It is better,’ Kennan continued, ‘to have a strong regime in power 
than a liberal government if it is indulgent and relaxed and penetrated by Communists’. Kennan quoted in 
Schmitz, Thank God They’re On Our Side, 149.
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Turkish President  İsmet  İnönü did  not  share  that  view.  On 12 October 1945,  he 
received Senator Claude Pepper (Democrat, Florida) and US Ambassador Edwin Wilson and 
told his guests that he wished to establish a genuinely representative democracy in Turkey,  
defining his criterion for success as follows: ‘The day when I can sit in the Assembly as 
leader of the Opposition, I shall regard my role in behalf of Turkey as fulfilled’.3 The decision 
to open Turkish politics led to İnönü’s defeat in the general elections of 1950, fulfilling the 
veteran statesman’s wishes. As he put it years later, ‘my defeat was my greatest victory’. 4
3 Edwin Wilson to the Secretary of State, telegram no.1352, Ankara, 19 October 1945, IAT, reel 1.
4 Quoted in Aydemir, İkinci Adam, 2: 415.
The Cold War in the Mediterranean Project
The European Institute, Columbia University
EXCERPT
Do not cite or quote without author's permission
2
